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Note
NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS v. FINLEY: SINKING
DEEPER INTO THE ABYSS OF THE SUPREME
COURT'S UNINTELLIGIBLE MODERN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CONDITIONS DOCTRINE
In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,1 the United States
Supreme Court considered whether a statute instructing the Commis-
sioner of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) to consider "de-
cency and respect" in granting funds to artists2 amounted to viewpoint
discrimination and whether this provision violated the First Amend-
ment' rights of NEA grant applicants.4 The Court held that because
the "decency and respect" provision does not expressly threaten the
censorship of ideas, there was no realistic danger that the provision
would compromise any First Amendment values.5 The majority justi-
fied this determination by declaring that to be facially invalid, the stat-
ute must "set forth a clear penalty, proscribe views on particular
disfavored subjects, and [suppress] distinctive idea[s] conveyed by a
distinctive message. '"6 By misapplying precedent and by advocating an
implausible construction of the statute in question, the Court has de-
scended further into the abyss of its inconsistent and unintelligible
modern unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and in so doing, has
provided Congress with a backdoor method of using selective grants
as a means of limiting speech and of suppressing First Amendment
rights.
I. THE CASE
The NEA was established by Congress in 1965 to support the arts
by "pledging federal funds to 'help create and sustain . . . a climate
1. 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998).
2. National Endowment for the Arts Act, 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1994). The Act
states, in relevant part, that "artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which
applications are judged, taking into consideration general standards of decency and re-
spect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public." Id.
3. The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2171-72.
5. See id. at 2176.
6. Id.
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encouraging freedom of thought, imagination, and inquiry."'7 But in 1990,
responding to public outrage resulting from the award of two particu-
lar NEA grants,' Congress amended the National Foundation on the
Arts and Humanities Act by directing "the Chairperson of the NEA to
ensure that 'artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by
which [grant] applications are judged, taking into consideration gen-
eral standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and val-
ues of the American public."' 9 While the NEA had not adopted an
official interpretation of this provision, referred to as § 954(d) (1), the
NEA's National Council unanimously approved a resolution to imple-
ment § 954(d) (1) "by ensuring that members of the advisory panels
that conduct the initial review of grant applications represent 'geo-
graphic, ethnic, and aesthetic diversity."' 1
Four artists, who applied for NEA grants before § 954(d) (1) was
enacted, filed suit against the NEA in federal district court after their
grant applications were rejected. The complaint alleged that the NEA
had violated their First Amendment rights by basing the rejection of
their applications on criteria "other than those set forth in the NEA's
enabling statute."11 The artists amended their complaint after Con-
7. Id, at 2172 (emphasis added) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 951(7) (1965)). Congress gave
the NEA "substantial discretion" to award these funds and "identifi[ed] only the broadest
funding priorities, including 'artistic and cultural significance, giving emphasis to Ameri-
can creativity and cultural diversity,' 'professional excellence,' and the encouragement of
'public knowledge, education, understanding, and appreciation of the arts.'" Id. (quoting
20 U.S.C. § 954(c)(1)-(10) (1965)).
8. Public outrage, in 1989, was directed at the NEA funding of Robert Map-
plethorpe's The Perfect Moment, which included "homoerotic photographs that several
Members of Congress condemned as pornographic," andJose Serrano's Piss Christ, "a pho-
tograph of a crucifix immersed in urine." Id (citing 135 Cong. Rec. 9789, 22,372 (1989)).
9. Id. at 2171 (alteration in original) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1990) (amend-
ing 20 U.S.C. § 954 (1965))); see supra note 2 (providing the relevant text). Congress ini-
tially reacted to the works of Mapplethorpe and Serrano "by eliminating $45,000 from the
agency's budget, the precise amount contributed to the two exhibits by NEA grant recipi-
ents" and by passing an amendment providing that the NEA may not use funds to support
works "considered obscene, including but not limited to, depictions of sadomasochism,
homoeroticism, the sexual exploitation of children, or individuals engaged in sex acts and
which, when taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value." Id. at 2172-73 (quoting Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropri-
ations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 738, 738-742 (1990)). After a federal district
court invalidated this amendment as unconstitutionally vague and the NEA declined to
appeal, Congress adopted the "decency and respect" requirement of § 954(d) (1). See id. at
2173 (citing Bella Lewitsky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal.
1991)).
10. Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2173 (citations omitted).
11. Id. at 2174. The four applicants, Karen Finley, John Fleck, Holly Hughes, and Tim
Miller, also alleged that the NEA "had breached the confidentiality of their grant applica-
tions through the release of quotations to the press, in violation of the Privacy Act of 1974."
Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1974)).
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gress enacted § 954(d) (1) to challenge the provision "as void for
vagueness and impermissibly viewpoint based. 12
The district court denied the NEA's motion for judgment on the
pleadings.13 The court, however, granted summary judgment in favor
of the artists on their claim that the "decency clause" in § 954(d) (1)
"is impermissibly vague under the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause and violates the First Amendment on its face."1 4 The court
rejected the NEA's argument that they could comply with § 954(d) (1)
by simply having diverse advisory panels in the selection process.' 5 Ac-
cording to the court, "a construction of the decency provision as re-
quiring only the diversification of panel membership would render
the 'decency' clause of § 954(d) without legal content."16 As for the
Fifth Amendment vagueness issue, the court concluded that the de-
cency clause did not adequately "notify applicants of what is required
of them or ... circumscribe NEA discretion" and that the clause was
therefore inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. 7 The court also found that "the decency clause clearly
12. Id. (citing First Amended Complaint, I Record, Doc. No. 16, p. 1 (Mar. 27, 1991)).
The four artists were also joined by the National Association of Artists' Organizations
(NAAO). See id.
According to the district court, the amended complaint alleged that the NEA "injured
plaintiffs' First Amendment interests by denying their applications because of the content
of their past artistic expression and by failing to provide a written statement of reasons for
the denial." Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1463 (C.D. Cal.
1992), afffd, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998).
13. See Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1463-68, 1476. The only claim excepted from the denial
of judgment on the pleadings was the "plaintiffs' claim that defendants failed to provide
them with a written statement of reasons for the denial...." Id. at 1464, 1476. According
to the court, the plaintiffs did not provide any authority to support this claim. See id. at
1464.
14. Id. at 1468, 1476; see supra note 3 (providing the relevant text of the First Amend-
ment). The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause states that no person shall "be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The court
stated that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause "requires that a statute be sufficiently
clearly defined so as not to cause persons 'of common intelligence-necessarily [to] guess
at its meaning and [to] differ as to its application.'" Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1471 (quoting
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
15. See Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1471.
16. Id. The court also rejected the NEA's alternative construction, "that 'decency' and
,respect' are factors only to the extent that they are implicit in the assessment of artistic
merit," as being contrary to congressional intent. Id.
17. Id. at 1472; see supra note 14 (describing the Fifth Amendment's due process re-
quirements). In reaching this conclusion, the district court adopted the artists' reasoning
"that there are an infinite number of values and beliefs, and correlatively, there may be no
national 'general standards of decency.'" Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1471 (quoting Bullfrog
Films v. Wick, 646 F. Supp. 492, 505 (C.D. Cal. 1986)).
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reaches a substantial amount of protected speech" and therefore vio-
lated the First Amendment."8
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
ruling.19 The court of appeals found that § 954(d) (1) forced the NEA
to ensure that grant applications were evaluated according to the "de-
cency and respect" provision which "was enacted to prevent the fund-
ing of particular types of art" and that the NEA Chairperson had "no
discretion to ignore this obligation, enforce only part of it, or give it a
cramped construction. " '0 The court concluded that § 954(d) (1)
could not be defined objectively, and therefore, the decency and re-
spect clause "gives rise to the danger of arbitrary and discriminatory
application."2 1 Accordingly, the court held that § 954(d) (1) was void
for vagueness under the Fifth Amendment and impermissibly re-
stricted the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights as well.2" In the alter-
native, the court held that § 954(d) (1) violated the First
Amendment's prohibition against placing content- and viewpoint-
based restrictions on protected speech.2 3 The court found that the
provision "authoriz[ed] viewpoint discrimination, as [an] 'egregious
18. Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1475-76; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the First Amendment). After this case, the NEA settled the individual respondents'
.statutory and as-applied constitutional claims by paying the amount of the vetoed grants,
damages, and attorney's fees." National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168,
2174 (1998) (citing Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, 6 Record, Doc. No. 128, pp.3-5
Uune 11, 1993)).
19. See Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 683-84 (9th Cir. 1996),
rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998).
20. Id. at 680.
21. Id. at 680-81. The court of appeals reasoned that the clause was "inherently ambig-
uous" and could vary in meaning among individuals. Id. at 680 (citing Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). Therefore, the court felt that the provision gave
government officials too much power to deny an application simply because it offended
that official's subjective beliefs and values. See id. at 680-81.
22. See id. at 681, 683-84.
23. See id. at 681-83. The court felt it was necessary to address this issue because of the
dissent's "argument that the government may restrict the content of speech it funds." Id.
at 681. In his dissent, Judge Kleinfeld acknowledged that "anyone in America ... has a
constitutional right to express himself indecently and offensively" and that indecency is
often an effective method for proving a point. Id. at 684 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). To
support this point, the dissent provided a list of supposed indecent works of art ranging
from Allen Ginsberg's poetry to Edouard Manet's painting, The Luncheon on the Grass. See
id. He further argued that indecency is often an effective method for proving a point and
lauded the First Amendment's protection of such works of art. See id. Judge Kleinfeld
concluded, however, that just because "offensive or indecent expression cannot be cen-
sored does not mean that the government has to pay for it." Id. According to the dissent,
the NEA provision under consideration does not prohibit "artists from expressing them-
selves indecently or disrespectfully," which would be unconstitutional; instead, the provi-
sion restricts the NEA's actions, which is not unconstitutional. Id. at 685.
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form of content discrimination"'24 and that "[b]ecause the govern-
ment has made no attempt to articulate a compelling interest served
by the provision, § 954(d) (1) cannot survive strict scrutiny. "25
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether
§ 954(d) (1) amounted to facially unconstitutional viewpoint discrimi-
nation and whether the provision was void for vagueness under the
First and Fifth Amendments. 26
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine was developed by the
Supreme Court to "mediate the boundary between constitutional
rights and government prerogatives in the areas of spending, licens-
ing, and employment."27 This doctrine governs the extent to which
the government may limit the constitutional rights of individuals who
are engaged in governmental programs or who receive governmental
benefits. 28 The Supreme Court has gone through two separate stages
in their development of an unconstitutional conditions doctrine
which can be grouped into "traditional" and "modern" categories.
From 1958, when the Supreme Court decided Speiser v. Randall,29 un-
til its 1987 decision in Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washing-
ton,3" the Court articulated a logical and generally consistent
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. This doctrine prevented the
government from denying benefits to an individual based on their
viewpoint," while also affording the government the right to allocate
24. Finley, 100 F.3d at 683 (quoting Rosenberger v. University of Va., 515 U.S. 819
(1995)).
25. Id. (footnotes omitted). The court noted that a content-based restriction on
speech is presumed unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny and that "[to] survive
this scrutiny, the government must advance a compelling interest." Id. at 681 (citations
omitted).
26. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2171-72. Although the Court in Finley also decided the
vagueness issue, it is not particularly relevant to our consideration of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine and it will not be discussed further in this Note. See id. at 2179-80.
27. Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism, 70
B.U. L. REv. 593, 593 (1990).
28. See id. at 593 n.2 ("In brief, the doctrine holds that although government may
choose not to provide certain benefits altogether, it may not condition the conferral of a
benefit, once provided on a beneficiary's waiver of a constitutional right." (citing L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 10-8, at 681 & n.9 (2d ed. 1988))).
29. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
30. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
31. See Speiser, 357 U.S. at 526; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Regan,
461 U.S. at 548. The only exception to this doctrine was that the government could dis-
criminate based on viewpoint if they demonstrated a clear interest in suppressing constitu-
tionally protected speech. See Speiser, 357 U.S. at 529.
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selectively benefits to organizations when the granting of such bene-
fits was not "aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas."3 2 Since
Arkansas Writers'Project, Inc. v. Ragland,33 however, the Court has been
far less consistent in its treatment of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine.
A. Traditional Unconstitutional Conditions Cases: The Development of a
Clear Doctrine
In its first unconstitutional conditions case, Speiser v. Randall, the
Supreme Court held that a California law requiring veterans to sign a
loyalty oath as a prerequisite to receiving tax exemptions amounted to
an unconstitutional violation of due process. 4 Articulating a clear un-
constitutional conditions doctrine, the Court found that a state could
not limit speech indirectly, through the denial of benefits, when it did
not have the right to regulate such speech directly. 5 The indirect reg-
ulation of speech, in this case the selective denial of tax exemptions,
was held to be unconstitutional because it coerced individuals to re-
frain from engaging in constitutionally protected speech and was
"frankly aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas."36 The Court
concluded that when a state seeks to deter an individual's right to free
speech, "due process demands that the speech be unencumbered un-
til the State comes forward with sufficient proof to justify its
inhibition."37
32. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 548-50 (noting that "[w] here governmental provision of sub-
sides is not 'aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas,' its 'power to encourage actions
deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader'" than when "the State at-
tempts to impose its will by force of law" (internal citations omitted) (quoting Cammarano
v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 476 (1977))).
33. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
34. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 515, 529.
35. See id at 526 (stating that "[i]t is apparent that a constitutional prohibition cannot
be transgressed indirectly by the creation of a statutory presumption any more than it can
be violated by direct enactment" (quoting Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 239 (1911))).
In a concurring opinionJustice Douglas stated that, "[i]f the Government may not impose
a tax upon the expression of ideas in order to discourage them, it may not achieve the
same end by reducing the individual who expresses his views to second-class citizenship by
withholding tax benefits granted others." Id. at 536 (Douglas, J., concurring).
36. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 519 (quoting American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382, 402 (1950)). The Court noted that "[t]o deny an exemption to claimants who
engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech. Its deter-
rent effect is the same as if the state were to fine them for the speech." Id at 518.
37. Id. at 528-29. While the Court did not discuss the circumstances under which a
state may inhibit speech, the Court alluded that a state would need a compelling interest.
See id. at 529 ("The State clearly has no such compelling interest at stake as to justify a
short-cut procedure which must inevitably result in suppressing protected speech.").
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Less than one year after deciding Speiser, in Cammarano v. United
States,38 the Court considered whether two Department of Treasury
regulations, forbidding businesses from claiming tax exemptions for
sums expended for the purpose of lobbying, violated the First Amend-
ment.39 The Court held that the regulations did not violate the First
Amendment, and in reaching this conclusion, the Court clarified
Speiser by stating that while a governmental entity could not indirectly
limit speech through the denial of tax exemptions, individuals had no
right to tax exemptions or to any other governmental benefits simply
because they were engaging in constitutionally protected activities.4 °
The Court reasoned that this case differed from Speiser because, in
Cammarano, the federal government was not penalizing anyone for en-
gaging in a constitutionally protected activity.41 Instead, because every-
one engaged in efforts to promote or to defeat legislation was required
to pay taxes relating to these activities, the nondiscriminatory denial
of a tax deduction for lobbying did not directly or indirectly limit any
constitutional rights.42
The Court continued to develop their clear unconstitutional con-
ditions doctrine in Perry v. Sindermann.4" In Perry, the Court held that
the lack of a contractual or of a tenure right to reemployment did not
defeat the claim of a college professor that the nonrenewal of his em-
ployment contract violated his free speech rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments." The Court followed their decisions in
Speiser and in Cammarano, reasoning that even though an inherent
right to receive a governmental benefit did not exist, a governmental
entity could not deny a benefit to an individual simply because he
engaged in a constitutionally protected activity.4" Therefore, if the
38. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
39. See id. at 512-13.
40. See id. at 513 ("Petitioners are not being denied a tax deduction because they en-
gage in constitutionally protected activities, but are simply being required to pay for those
activities out of their own pocket ...
41. See id.
42. See id. In his concurring opinion,Justice Douglas explained that were the Court to
hold these regulations unconstitutional, they would be lending support to the discredited
notion that "First Amendment rights are somehow not fully realized unless they are subsi-
dized by the State." Id. (citing Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573,
578 (1944)).
43. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
44. See id. at 599, 602-03.
45. See id. at 597 ("[Elven though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental
benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of
reasons... [i] t may not deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected
interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech.").
2000]
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professor had been denied further employment for engaging in con-
stitutionally protected speech, the college would be, in effect,
"produc [ing] a result which [it] could not command directly," in vio-
lation of the First Amendment.46
In Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington,47 the Court
was once again called upon to determine the constitutionality of a
federal tax exemption scheme. Furthering its consistent unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine, the Court ruled that Congress's decision to
allow a selective tax subsidy for veterans groups who were engaged in
lobbying did not violate the First and Fifth Amendment rights of non-
subsidized entities, even though the subsidy was not extended to other
nonprofit organizations engaged in lobbying.4" The Court first re-
jected the petitioner's argument that this denial of a tax exemption
for other groups engaged in lobbying activities constituted an "uncon-
stitutional condition" as articulated in Speiser and in Perry.49 Instead,
the majority likened the situation here to the one present in Camma-
rano, reasoning that "Congress has not infringed any First Amend-
ment rights or regulated any First Amendment activity," but has
instead simply chosen not to pay for the lobbying efforts of other orga-
nizations out of public moneys.5"
The Court reasoned that this was not a case in which Congress
was allocating subsidies in such a way as to "aim [ ] at the suppression
of dangerous ideas" because qualified veterans' organizations were en-
titled to receive an exemption regardless of the "content" of the
speech that they might engage in, including lobbying.5 The Court
also indicated that Congress must be given wide discretion in their
decisions to grant selective tax benefits, provided that the granting of
such benefits is not aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas.5 2 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court preserved the distinction between
46. Id. (alteration in original) (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
47. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
48. See id. at 545-48.
49. See id. at 545-46.
50. Id. at 546.
51. Id. at 548-50 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cammarano v. United
States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)). Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion, agreed with
the majority that this tax scheme's discrimination between veterans' organizations and
other nonprofit organizations was not based on "the content of their speech." Id. at 551
(Blackmun,J., concurring). He also noted, as did the majority, that "a statute designed to
discourage the expression of particular views would present a very different question." Id.
(citing Regan, 461 U.S. at 548, 550)
52. Id. at 548-49 ("Congressional selection of particular entities or persons for entitle-
ment to this sort of largesse 'is obviously a matter of policy and discretion not open to
judicial review unless in circumstances which here we are not able to find.'" (quoting
United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 444 (1896))).
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constitutionally permissible regulations that selectively grant tax bene-
fits to organizations that engage in constitutionally protected speech
and those regulations that impermissibly deny tax benefits to an or-
ganization because they engage in such activities."
B. Modern Unconstitutional Conditions Cases: An Era of Inconsistencies
Four years after deciding Regan, the Court revisited the unconsti-
tutional conditions doctrine in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v.
Ragland,54 where it held that an Arkansas law, which selectively ex-
empted certain types of publications from a generally applicable per-
sonal property tax, violated the First Amendment. 5 The Court ruled
that because, under the Arkansas law, a magazine's tax status de-
pended entirely on its content and because each magazine was subject
to official scrutiny to determine its content, the law in question
amounted to an unconstitutional content-based regulation.56 In so
holding, the Court altered its unconstitutional conditions doctrine by
extending its analysis of the selective allocation of benefits from sim-
ply considering whether a tax exemption discriminates against a par-
ticular viewpoint, to whether a tax exemption amounts to
discrimination against an entire subject area.57
Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that this case was analogous to
Regan and Cammarano, in that the Arkansas legislature had simply de-
cided not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right, which did
not in itself infringe upon that right.5" Justice Scalia also reasoned
that this tax exemption scheme did not infringe upon any constitu-
53. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 548-49.
54. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
55. The Arkansas law at issue exempted from the general state sales tax "[g]ross re-
ceipts or gross proceeds derived from the sale of newspapers . . . and religious, profes-
sional, trade, and sports journals and/or publications printed and published within [the
state of Arkansas]." Id. at 224 (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted) (citing ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 84-1904(f), (j) (1980)).
56. See id. at 230.
57. See id. The Court stated:
Arkansas' system of selective taxation does not evade the strictures of the First
Amendment merely because it does not burden the expression of particular views
by specific [publications] .... The First Amendment's hostility to content-based
regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to
prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980)) (citing FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383-84
(1984); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 400, 518-19 (1981) (plurality opinion);
Cavey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 n.6 (1980)).
58. See id. at 236 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation,
461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983)).
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tional rights because it did not have "significant coercive effect. '59 Jus-
tice Scalia did concede, however, that a different result might be
reached where "the subsidy pertains to the expression of a particular view-
point on a matter of political concern."6
In its next unconstitutional conditions case, Rust v. Sullivan,61 the
Court considered a First Amendment challenge to several Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations that prohib-
ited Title X family planning funds62 from being used for counseling
that advocated abortion as a method of family planning.6" The Court
rejected this challenge, holding that the HHS regulations did not vio-
late the First Amendment by impermissibly discriminating on the ba-
sis of viewpoint because they only prohibited family planning projects
that received federal funds from discussing abortion as a viable family
planning option.6 4 Determining that "there is a basic difference be-
tween direct state interference with a protected activity and encour-
agement of an alternative activity, '6 5 the Court stated that the
government "may 'make a value judgment favoring childbirth over
abortion .... and [may] implement this judgment through the alloca-
tion of public funds."' 6 The Court explained that forbidding doctors
59. Id. at 237. Justice Scalia argued that it was "implausible" that a generally applicable
sales tax, "with a few enumerated exceptions, was meant to inhibit, or had the effect of
inhibiting," the publications at issue in this case. Id.
60. Id (emphasis added).
61. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
62. According to the Court, Title X of the Public Health Service Act granted authority
to the Secretary of HHS to "make grants to and to enter into contracts with ... entities to
assist in the establishment and operation of voluntary family planning projects" but re-
quired that no Title X funds be provided for use "in programs where abortion is a method
of family planning." Id. at 178 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 300a-4a-6 (1970)).
63. See id. at 179, 181. The regulations at issue here attached three conditions to the
receipt of Title X funds by a family planning project. First, the project could not provide
counseling concerning the use of abortion as a method of family planning or provide
referrals for abortions as a method of family planning. See id. at 179 (citing 42 C.F.R
§ 59.8(a)(1) (1989)). Second, the regulations prohibited a project receiving Title X funds
from "engaging in activities that 'encourage, promote or advocate abortion as a method of
family planning.'" Id. at 180 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(a)). Finally, a Title X project
would have to be organized in such a manner as to be " ' physically and financially separate'
from prohibited abortion activities." Id. (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.9).
64. See id. at 192, 203.
65. Id at 193.
66. Id. at 192-93 (first alteration in original) (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474
(1977)). Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, concluded that because due process
grants no affirmative right to governmental aid, even if necessary to secure life, liberty, or
property, the government has no constitutional duty to subsidize activities related to abor-
tion simply because the act is a constitutionally permissible one. See id at 201 (citation
omitted). The dissent argued that this conclusion was flawed and, citing Regan and Cam-
marano, determined that the Title X regulations were not constitutional because they "dis-
criminate[d] invidiously .. . in such a way as to aim[ ] at the suppression of dangerous
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who receive Tide X funds from discussing abortion as a family plan-
ning option did not constitute viewpoint discrimination, but was
merely the government's choice to "fund one activity to the exclusion
of the other."6 7 The Court rejected analogies to its Arkansas Writers'
Project decision, stating that the present case did not involve the "sin-
gling out [of] a disfavored group on the basis of speech content, but
[was] a case of the Government refusing to fund activities, including
speech, which are specifically excluded from the scope of the project
funded."68
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by two
other justices,69 criticized the majority's position, asserting that
"[u]ntil today, the Court never has upheld viewpoint-based suppres-
sion of speech simply because that suppression was a condition upon
the acceptance of public funds."" Blackmun, citing the "explicitly
viewpoint based" language of the regulations, concluded that
"[w] hatever may be the Government's power to condition the receipt
ideas." Id. at 208 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Regan v. Tax-
ation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983) (quoting Cammarano v. United States,
358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959))). Justice Blackmun stated that "[b]y refusing to fund those
family-planning projects that advocate abortion because they advocate abortion, the Govern-
ment plainly has targeted a particular viewpoint." Id, at 210.
67. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193. The majority further explained that if it was to hold that the
Government has unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of viewpoint when it
"chooses to fund a program dedicated to advance certain goals, because the program in
advancing those goals necessarily discourages alternative goals, numerous Government
programs would be rendered constitutionally suspect." Id. at 194. Furthermore, according
to the majority, such a holding would essentially require the Government to "subsidize
analogous counterpart rights" whenever it wished to subsidize any one protected right, a
proposition that the Court "has soundly rejected." Id. (citing Regan v. Taxation with Rep-
resentation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464 (1977)).
68. Id. at 194-95; see also supra notes 43-50 (discussing the Arkansas Writers'Project deci-
sion). The Court also justified its holding by stating that "[bly requiring that the Title X
grantee engage in abortion-related activity separately from activity receiving federal fund-
ing, Congress has, consistent with our teachings in . . . Regan, not denied it the right to
engage in abortion-related activities." Id. at 198. But in determining that Congress is not
forbidding a doctor from discussing abortion when consulting clients outside of the scope
of Title X funding, the Court never mentioned their consideration of a similar issue dis-
cussed in Arkansas Writers' Project, where the majority stated that, "[i]t hardly answers one
person's objection to a restriction on his speech that another person, outside his control,
may speak for him." Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987). In
reaching this conclusion, the Court also cited its decision in Virginia Pharmacy Board v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., where it stated that "[w]e are aware of no general
principle that freedom of speech may be abridged when the speaker's listeners could come
by his message by some other means." 425 U.S. 748, 757 n.15 (1976).
69. Justice Blackmun's Rust dissent was joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens. Justice
O'Connor joined part of Blackmun's dissent, but did not join in his assessment of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 203-04.
70. Id. at 207 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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of its largess upon the relinquishment of constitutional rights, it surely
does not extend to a condition that suppresses the recipient's cher-
ished freedom of speech based solely upon the content or viewpoint
of that speech."'" The dissent also criticized the majority's conclusion
that the regulations were constitutional because they merely repre-
sented Congress's choice to "fund one activity to the exclusion of the
other," arguing that "there are some bases upon which the govern-
ment may not rest its decision to fund or not to fund. 'v2
In its most recent unconstitutional conditions decision, Rosenber-
ger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia,73 the Supreme Court, by
a bare majority, held that a state university's funding guidelines that
denied generally available student activity funds to organizations en-
gaged in "religious activities" violated the First Amendment.74 The
Court rejected the state's argument that the university guidelines dis-
criminated on the basis of content, rather than on the basis of view-
point. The Court relied on the fact that the University permitted
funding when religion was discussed as "subject matter," but denied
funding for "those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial
viewpoints."75 Rather than attempting to follow the unconstitutional
71. Id. (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1958)). Justice Blackmun went
on to state that "[a] regulation of speech that is motivated by nothing more than a desire
to curtail expression of a particular point of view on controversial issues of general interest
is the purest example of a law ... abridging the freedom of speech." Id. at 208 (quoting
FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383-84 (1984) (quoting Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 546 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring))).
In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens discussed the language of the controlling statute for
Title X funding, the Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970, and
determined that the statute was "directed at conduct, rather than the dissemination of
information or advice." Id. at 220-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 210 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun noted that just as the Court
would not allow funding decisions to be based upon the race of an applicant, "our cases
make clear that ideological viewpoint is a similarly repugnant ground upon which to base
funding decisions." Id. at 210-11.
73. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
74. Id at 824-25, 837. The University defined "religious activity" as any activity that
"primarily promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate
reality." Id. at 825 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 831. The majority explained:
Religion may be a vast area of inquiry, but it also provides, as it did here, a specific
premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a variety of subjects may be dis-
cussed and considered. The prohibited perspective, not the general subject mat-
ter, resulted in the refusal to make ... payments, for the subjects discussed were
otherwise within the approved category of publications.
Id.
Although the Court found that viewpoint discrimination had occurred in this particu-
lar case, it never defined exactly what constituted content, versus viewpoint, discrimina-
tion. The closest the majority came to defining this distinction was when they stated that
"discrimination against one set of views or ideas is but a subset or particular instance of the
236
NA TIONAL EAvDo WmEVT FOR THE ATs V FrI NLEY
conditions principles enunciated in Arkansas Writers' Project and in
Rust, the Court created a new standard, holding that when the govern-
ment is acting as speaker or is subsidizing the transmittal of a govern-
mental message, it may make content and viewpoint-based choices,
but when the government expends funds to "encourage a diversity of
views from private speakers," it may not discriminate based on view-
point.76 In adopting this new test, the Court further explained that
when allocating funds to "encourage a diversity of views," the limited
availability of those funds would not justify discrimination based on
viewpoint. 77 Applying this test to the University's funding program,
the Court determined that the University was not attempting to trans-
mit its own message through the program, but was instead "en-
courag[ing] a diversity of views from private speakers. '7 Therefore,
the University, "having offered to . . . [subsidize student organiza-
tions] on behalf of private speakers who convey their own message,"
could not "silence the expression of selected viewpoints."79
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Souter, joined by three other jus-
tices,8 ° disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the University's
funding guidelines constituted viewpoint discrimination. 81 Souter ar-
gued that the issue of whether a governmental regulation creates a
distinction based on viewpoint "turns on whether the burden on
speech is explained by reference to the viewpoint" and not "whether
the . . .regulation happens to be applied to a speaker who seeks to
advance a particular viewpoint. '82 Accordingly, Souter reasoned, "the
more general phenomenon of content discrimination." Id. at 830-31 (citing R.A.V. v. St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992)). The Court admitted, however, that "the distinction is not
a precise one." Id. at 831.
76. Id. at 833-34 (stating that "when the government appropriates public funds to pro-
mote a particular policy of its own, it is entitled to say what it wishes," but that "viewpoint-
based restrictions are [not] proper when the [government] does not itself speak or subsi-
dize transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of
views from private speakers" (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)).
77. Id. at 835 ("The government cannot justify viewpoint discrimination among private
speakers on the economic fact of scarcity.").
78. Id. at 834-35. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court considered as important the
fact that the University required each student group to sign an agreement that declares
that the group is not an agent of the University and is not subject to its control. See id. at
835.
79. Id. at 835.
80. Souter's dissent was joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. at 863
(Souter, J., dissenting).
81. See id. at 895 ("There is no viewpoint discrimination in the University's application
of its Guidelines to deny funding to [petitioner's organization].").
82. Id. at 893 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)). To explain this
concept, Souter provided the example of a city enforcing its excessive noise ordinance by
pulling the plug on a rock band using a forbidden amplification system." Id. at 894. Such
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prohibition on viewpoint discrimination serves that important pur-
pose of the Free Speech Clause, which is to bar the government from
skewing public debate" by "allow[ing] one message while prohibiting
the messages of those who can be reasonably expected to respond.""3
Souter found that because the University's guidelines denied funds to
all groups that expressed views on the merits of religion, the guide-
lines did not amount to viewpoint discrimination. 84 The dissent con-
cluded by stating that if these funding guidelines constituted
viewpoint discrimination, then "the Court has all but eviscerated the
line between viewpoint and content. "85
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,86 the Court held that
the "decency and respect" criteria of § 954(d) (1) was facially valid be-
cause the provision did not sufficiently compromise First Amendment
rights and that the government may allocate competitive funding ac-
cording to criteria that would be impermissible if "direct regulation of
speech or a criminal penalty [was] at stake. '87 Writing for the major-
ity, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Stevens, Kennedy, Breyer, and Ginsburg,88 initially noted that because
the respondents had raised a facial constitutional challenge to
§ 954(d) (1), they confronted a "'heavy burden' in advancing their
claim"89 and that to prevail, the respondents would be required to
"demonstrate a substantial risk that application of the provision will
lead to the suppression of speech."9 ° Examining § 954(d) (1), the
Court agreed with the NEA that the provision was "merely hortatory"
and simply added "considerations" to the grant-making process and
that the provision did not "preclude awards to projects that might be
an action would not constitute viewpoint discrimination simply because the rock band was
using its equipment to "espouse antiracist views." Id. (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781 (1989)).
83. Id. (citing United States v. KoKinda, 497 U.S. 720, 736 (1990) (plurality opinion);
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785-86 (1978); Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1976)).
84. See id, at 895-86.
85. Id. at 898.
86. 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998).
87. Id. at 2179-80.
88. Id. at 2171. Justice Ginsburgjoined the majority's opinion except for Part I.B, in
which the Court suggested that the constitutionality of 954(d)(1) could also be explained
as a legitimate choice by Congress to fund selectively a program to encourage certain activ-
ities without funding alternative programs. See id. at 2179-80 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173, 193 (1991)).
89. Id. at 2175 (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 183).
90. Id. (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)).
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deemed 'indecent' or 'disrespectful,' or even specify that those factors
must be given any particular weight in reviewing an application."91
The Court also considered the "political context surrounding the
adoption of the 'decency' and 'respect' clause," and determined that
it was inconsistent with the respondents' argument that § 954(d) (1)
compelled the denial of grants based on viewpoint.9 2 Based on this
determination, the Court concluded that there was no realistic danger
that the "decency" and "respect" criteria of § 954(d) (1) would "com-
promise First Amendment values" because the criteria "do [es] not si-
lence speakers by expressly 'threaten[ing] censorship of ideas."'' 3 The
Court then proceeded to further justify their finding that a clear pen-
alty did not exist in § 954(d) (1) by stating that because people would
generally not agree as to what constitutes "decency" and "respect,"
"the provision does not introduce considerations that, in practice,
would effectively preclude or punish the expression of particular
views."
94
The majority also rejected the respondents' reliance on Rosenber-
ger, asserting that the NEA grant-making process was distinguishable
from the facts of Rosenberger on account of the "competitive process
according to which [NEA] grants are allocated."9 5 The majority ex-
plained that unlike the situation in Rosenberger, in the context of arts
funding, the "Government does not indiscriminately 'encourage a di-
versity of views from private speakers."'96 Therefore, the majority rea-
soned that the NEA's mandate to make content-based judgments
concerning the "artistic excellence" of applications set it apart from
the subsidy considered in Rosenberger, which was made generally avail-
able to all student organizations.97
Finally, the majority noted that although the "First Amendment
certainly has application in the subsidy context," the government may
91. Id. The Court justified this interpretation by stating that "when Congress .. . has
intended to affirmatively constrain the NEA's grant-making authority, it has done so in no
uncertain terms." Id. at 2176 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (2) (1990)). The Court did not
pass judgment on the NEA's determination that § 954(d)(1) could be "adequately imple-
mented . . . merely by ensuring the representation of various backgrounds and points of
view on the advisory panels that analyze grant applications." Id. at 2175 (citations
omitted).
92. Id. at 2176.
93. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 393 (1992)).
94. Id. at 2177.
95. Id. at 2178; see also supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text (examining the facts
and issues in Rosenberger).
96. Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2178 (quoting Rosenberger v. University of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
834 (1995)).
97. See id. (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 824).
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"distribute competitive funding according to criteria that would be im-
permissible were direct regulation of speech or a criminal penalty at
stake."9 Quoting Rust v. Sullivan, the Court stated that Congress may
"selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes
to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alter-
native program which seeks to deal with the problem in another
way."99 In so deciding, the majority noted that "the government has
not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to
fund one activity to the exclusion of the other."1 °
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas,
attacked the majority for essentially "sustain [ing] the constitutionality
of 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (1) by gutting it."1 °1 Justice Scalia argued that
§ 954(d) (1) constituted viewpoint discrimination because the "de-
cency and respect" provision, if it meant anything, would require at
least that NEA grant applications displaying decency and respect
would be favored over those that did not.10 2 Holding true to his Ar-
kansas Writers' Project dissent, however, Justice Scalia argued that be-
cause the First Amendment has no application to government
funding decisions, Congress has every right to fund selectively speech
that it deems to be in the public interest, regardless of whether such
funding involves viewpoint discrimination.10 3
Filing the lone dissent, Justice Souter took issue with the major-
ity's conclusion, finding that "[a]bove all else, the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of
its message [or] its ideas."' 4 Responding to the Court's finding that
the "decency and respect" provision is so illusive that it could not have
the practical effect of "preclud[ing] or punish [ing] the expression of
98. Id. at 2179.
99. Id. (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991)); see also supra notes 61-72
(discussing the facts and issues in the Rust decision).
100. Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2179 (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 193) (citing Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464 (1977)).
101. Id. at 2180 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia began his opinion by remarking
of the Court's decision: "[t]he operation was a success, but the patient died." Id.
102. See id. at 2181. Justice Scalia noted, in a footnote, that he believed that the statute
should be upheld regardless of whether it constituted content or viewpoint discrimination,
and therefore he "pass[ed] over this conundrum and assum[ed] the worst." Id. at 2181
n. 1.
103. See id. at 2182-84. Justice Scalia argued that because the First Amendment only
prohibits those government actions that abridge freedom of speech, it does not apply to
those instances where Congress merely refuses to fund constitutionally protected speech. See
id.
104. Id. at 2185 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 95 (1972)).
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particular views,"10 5 Souter stated that regardless of whether the stan-
dards are imprecise, "the First Amendment has never been read to
allow the government to rove around imposing general standards of
decency."106 Souterjustified this statement by asserting that "'general
standards of decency' are quintessentially viewpoint based: they re-
quire discrimination on the basis of conformity with mainstream mo-
res."10 7  Souter also disagreed with the Court's reading of the
legislative history of § 954(d) (1), citing the statements of several
members of Congress who suggested that the provision would prevent
public funds from being spent on art deemed "indecent" or "disre-
spectful."' 0 8 Souter then attacked the majority's conclusion that re-
gardless of the presence of viewpoint discrimination, "there is no
constitutional issue here because government arts subsidies fall within
a zone of activity free from First Amendment restraints."'0 9 He ar-
gued that Rosenberger was clearly controlling and that under Rosenber-
ger, § 954(d) (1) constituted unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination
because the funding of the arts, through the NEA, is more appropri-
ately characterized as "encourag[ing] a diversity of views from private
speakers," rather than the state "disburs[ing] public funds to private
entities to convey a governmental message."'
10
IV. ANALYSIS
In Finley, the Supreme Court has extended its modern unconsti-
tutional conditions doctrine. In the process, the Court has provided
Congress with a method of employing selective grants as a means of
limiting speech and of suppressing First Amendment rights. These
results were a direct outcome of the Court's implausible construction
of § 954(d) (1), abandonment of precedent with regard to viewpoint
discrimination, and misapplication of the standards articulated in Rust
and Rosenberger.
105. Id. at 2177.
106. Id. at 2187.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2186.
109. Id, at 2190.
110. Id. at 2191 (quoting Rosenberger v. University of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833-34 (1995)).
But see Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2178 (distinguishing Rosenberger from the case at hand); supra
notes 95-97 and accompanying text (noting the Finley majority's rejection of the Respon-
dents' reliance on Rosenberger). See also supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text (explain-
ing the facts and issues in the Rosenberger decision).
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A. Implausible Construction of § 954(d)(1)
Even before analyzing the impact of the "decency and respect"
provision in the context of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
the Supreme Court advocated an implausible construction of
§ 954(d) (1) by determining that this provision is only a "considera-
tion" and "does not preclude awards to projects that might be deemed
indecent or disrespectful... or even specify that those factors must be
given any particular weight in reviewing an application."11' The
Court's conclusion ignores the fact that the language of § 954(d) (1),
to have any meaning at all, will require that those evaluating NEA
grant applications, in every instance, give preference to applicants
whose work promotes "general standards of decency and respect for
the diverse beliefs and values of Americans" over those that do not.' 12
If no preference need be shown for "decent and respectful" art, then
the language of § 954(d) (1) has no legal effect whatsoever because it
does not actually require anything." 3 To conclude that this result is
what Congress intended is not only illogical, but contrary to a variety
of statements made in the course of the legislative effort to pass
§ 954(d) (1).114 Although the majority avoided deciding the issue, it is
111. Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2175; see text accompanying supra note 87.
112. SeeFinley, 118 S. Ct. at 2181 (ScaliaJ., concurring) (agreeing with the majority that
§ 954(d) (1) "'imposes no categorical requirement' ... in the sense that it does not require
the denial of all applications that violate general standards of decency or exhibit disrespect
for the diverse beliefs and values of Americans" but pointing out that "[t]o the extent a
particular applicant exhibits disrespect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American
public or fails to comport with general standards of decency, the likelihood that he will
receive a grant diminishes" (internal citations omitted)); id. at 2189 (SouterJ., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court's interpretation of § 954(d)(1) did not amount to a "fair reading"
because "it cannot be read as tolerating awards to spread indecency or disrespect, so long
as the review panel, the National Counsel on the Arts, and the Chairperson [of the NEA]
have given some thought to the offending qualities and decided to underwrite them
anyway").
113. See id. at 2180 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court's interpretation of
§ 954(d) (1) effectively guts the provision of its meaning and that "[t]he most avid congres-
sional opponents of the provision could not have asked for more"); see also Finley v. Na-
tional Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1470 (C.D. Cal. 1992), affd, 100 F.3d
671 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998) (stating that "it is clear from the language
of the statute that 'decency' and 'respect' for diverse beliefs are factors to be considered in
determining artistic merit," and therefore eligibility for funding).
114. See 136 CONG. REc. 28,631 (1990) ("We add to the criteria of artistic excellence and
artistic merit, a shell, a screen, a viewpoint that must be constantly taken into account on
behalf o[f] the American public which sponsors and upholds this agency."); id. at 28,624
("[W] e have added language.., which underscores that the decisions of artistic excellence
must take into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse be-
liefs and values of the American public. Works which deeply offend the sensibilities of
significant portions of the public ought not to be supported with public funds" (emphasis
added)); id. at 28,672 ("I want to reiterate this lest there be any public misunderstanding-
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also clear that the mandate of § 954(d) (1) cannot be fulfilled by sim-
ply having the NEA staff its review panels with persons representing
"various backgrounds and points of view."" t ' As Justice Scalia cor-
rectly pointed out:
A diverse panel membership increases the odds that, if and
when the panel takes the factors into account, it will reach an
accurate assessment of what they demand. But it in no way
increases the odds that the panel will take the factors into
consideration-much less ensures that the panel will do so,
which is the Chairperson [of the NEA's] duty under the
statute. 1
1 6
B. The Abandonment of "Viewpoint Discrimination" Precedent
The majority erred in its conclusion that the "decency and re-
spect" clause of § 954(d) (1) does not constitute unconstitutional view-
point-based discrimination. One of the few clear messages that had
consistently been conveyed throughout the Court's unconstitutional
conditions decisions, including Speiser, Cammarano, and Regan, was
that Congress could never discriminate in allocating subsidies in such
a way as to aim at the "suppression of dangerous ideas."' 17 The Court
there is new language now in the grant procedure itself which mandates that in the award-
ing of funds, in the award process itself, general standards of decency must be accorded.");
see also Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2182 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("It is evident in the legislative
history that § 954(d)(1) was prompted by, and directed at, the public funding of such
offensive productions as [Serrano and Mapplethorpe's work] ... [I]t is perfectly clear that
the statute was meant to disfavor-that is to discriminate against-such productions."); id.
at 2189 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that according to the author of § 954(d)(1), the
decency and respect provision mandates that general standards of decency be accorded).
But see Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2176 (asserting that the "political context surrounding the adop-
tion of the 'decency and respect' clause is inconsistent with respondents' assertion that the
provision compels the NEA to deny funding on the basis of viewpoint discriminatory
criteria").
115. See id. at 2181 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that this method of compliance
"is so obviously inadequate that it insults the intelligence"); id. at 2189 (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (asserting that "it defies the . . . plain language [of § 954(d)(1)] to suggest that the
NEA complies with the law merely by allowing decency and respect to have their way
through the subconscious inclinations of panel members" because "taking into considera-
tion is a conscious activity" and even if this method of compliance was sufficient, it "would
merely mean that the selection for decency and respect would occur derivatively through
the inclinations of the panel members, instead of directly through the intentional applica-
tion of the criteria" and would still constitute impermissible viewpoint discrimination).
116. Id. at 2181 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983) (suggesting
that the case would be decided differently if Congress were to allocate subsidies "in such a
way as to 'aim at the suppression of dangerous ideas'" (quoting Cammarano v. United
States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959))); Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513 (stating that "nondiscrimi-
natory denial of deduction from gross income [is valid because it is] ... plainly 'not aimed
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even stated, just three years before deciding Finley, that "[w] hen the
government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by
speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the
more blatant."'
' 18
Comparing the statute in question with others that have been in-
validated by the Court, the majority distinguished § 954(d) (1) by stat-
ing that the provision does not reach the threshold required to
constitute viewpoint discrimination because § 954(d) (1) merely adds
"considerations" to the grant-making process,11 and because "one
would be hard-pressed to find two people in the United States who
could agree on what the diverse beliefs and values of the American
public are, much less on whether a particular work of art respects
them."'12 Even assuming that these determinations are correct, they
do not support the Court's conclusion that § 954(d) (1) does not con-
stitute viewpoint discrimination. 21 Although § 954(d) (1) may not ab-
solutely compel the denial of NEA funding for artworks considered
"indecent" or "disrespectful" by the NEA reviewing authorities, the
fact that art deemed to be "indecent" or to be "disrespectful" must be
disfavored to some extent is enough, 12 2 under the Court's various un-
constitutional conditions pronouncements, to brand the provision as
viewpoint discrimination. 121 In his dissent, Justice Souter aptly
at the suppression of dangerous ideas'" (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519
(1958))); Speiser, 357 U.S. at 519 (stating that in Speiser the denial of a tax exemption is
invalid because it "is frankly aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas" (quoting Ameri-
can Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950))).
118. Rosenberger v. University of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992)).
119. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2175.
120. Id. at 2176.
121. See id. at 2189 (SouterJ., dissenting) ("[E]ven if I found the Court's view of 'con-
sideration' plausible, that would make no difference at all on the question of
constitutionality.").
122. See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text (discussing why the majority's con-
clusion that § 954(d) (1) did not compel the NEA to give any particular weight to consider-
ations of "decency and respect" was erroneous).
123. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828-30 (stating that "[w]hen the government targets
not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the
First Amendment is all the more blatant" and that the "government must abstain from
regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of
the speaker is the rationale for the restriction" (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391
(1992); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983))); see also
id. at 894 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Other things being equal, viewpoint discrimination oc-
curs when government allows one message while prohibiting the messages of those who
can be reasonably expected to respond" (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
785-86 (1978); Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429
U.S. 167, 175-76 (1976); United States v. KoKinda, 497 U.S. 720, 736 (1990))).
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pointed out the inherent flaw in the majority's reasoning by posing a
compelling question:
What if the statute required a panel to apply criteria "taking
into consideration the centrality of Christianity to the Ameri-
can cultural experience," or "taking into consideration
whether the artist is a communist," or "taking into considera-
tion the political message conveyed by the art," or even "tak-
ing into consideration the superiority of the white race"?
Would the Court hold these considerations facially constitu-
tional merely because the statute had no requirement to give
them any particular, much less controlling, weight? I assume
not.
1 24
For similar reasons, the Court's conclusion that § 954(d) (1) will not
result in viewpoint discrimination because "the considerations enu-
merated in § 954(d) (1) [are] susceptible to multiple interpreta-
tions"'1 25 is unconvincing.1 26 The fact that "decency and respect" are
interpreted differently by a variety of people only means that a wider
range of viewpoints is subject to suppression, not that viewpoint dis-
crimination will be lacking. 127 As Rosenberger explicitly stated, the "ex-
clusion of several views on [any particular] problem is just as offensive
to the First Amendment as exclusion of only one.'
28
124. Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2189-90 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also provided a
hypothetical that effectively questions the merit of the majority's reasoning on this issue.
Scalia stated that the conclusion that § 954(d) (1) constitutes viewpoint discrimination
is not altered by the fact that the statute does not 'compel' the denial of funding
any more than a provision imposing a five-point handicap on all black applicants
for civil service jobs is saved from being race discrimination by the fact that it does
not compel the rejection of all black applicants.
Id. at 2181 (ScaliaJ., concurring) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Finley, 118 S. Ct. at
2176).
125. Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2177.
126. See id. at 2181-82 (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that "the conclusion of view-
point discrimination is not affected by the fact that what constitutes 'decency' or 'the di-
verse beliefs and values of the American people' is difficult to pin down" (quoting Finley,
118 S. Ct. at 2176)).
127. See id. at 2188 (SouterJ., dissenting) ("The fact that [§ 954(d) (1)] . .. disfavors art
insufficiently respectful of America's 'diverse' beliefs and values [does not alter the conclu-
sion that it constitutes viewpoint discrimination] . . . the First Amendment does not vali-
date the ambition to disqualify many disrespectful viewpoints instead of merely one."
(citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831-32)). In advancing its argument, the Court appeared to
suggest that § 954(d) (1) cannot be labeled as viewpoint discrimination because it is impos-
sible to determine exactly what viewpoint is being disfavored. The Court, however, has
never insisted upon such a rigorous determination in assessing viewpoint discrimination in
the context of government subsidies. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 (expressing some
difficulty in labeling "religious thought" as a particular viewpoint or broad subject matter,
but making no effort to define exactly what constitutes a religious viewpoint).
128. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
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These distinctions lead the Court to conclude that regardless of
what limitations are placed on artists seeking NEA funding, the fact
that § 954(d) (1) does not "expressly threaten [the] censorship of
ideas," is sufficient proof that the provision will not compromise any
First Amendment values.1 29  In adopting the "express" censorship
threshold for determining whether a statute is unconstitutionally view-
point-based,13 ° the majority created a backdoor method for the gov-
ernment to tread on the First Amendment rights of the recipients of
governmental benefits. This new standard implicitly gives the Con-
gress carte blanche to discriminate against individual viewpoints, pro-
vided that they do so in such broad terms that the specific speech they
are trying to suppress is not absolutely clear on its face or provided
they do so in a way that may be "susceptible to multiple interpreta-
tions." '131 Although the majority in Finley might respond that an as
applied challenge would be viable if a governmental entity uses the
challenged law or regulation to actually engage in viewpoint discrimi-
nation, 132 it may be difficult, if not impossible, to prove successfully
such discrimination when the entity is making funding determina-
tions based on subjective criteria.133 To avoidjudicial scrutiny, a gov-
ernmental entity could simply explain that their decision not to fund
a particular project or activity was the result of a permissible subjective
content-based decision, rather than an impermissible viewpoint-based
decision.
C. Misapplication of the Rust and Rosenberger Standards
In addition to misconstruing the language of § 954(d) (1), the
Finley Court also misapplied the Court's unconstitutional conditions
129. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2176.
130. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's "express" cen-
sorship determination).
131. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2177.
132. See id. at 2178. The Court explained:
If the NEA were to leverage its power to award subsidies on the basis of subjective
criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints, then we would confront a differ-
ent case. We have stated that, even in the provision of subsidies, the Government
may not "ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas."
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540,
550 (1982)).
133. Such is the case with the NEA, where, under § 954(d)(1), "artistic excellence and
artistic merit are the criteria by which applications are judged, taking into consideration
general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American
public." 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1994). Because this provision allows the NEA to base
funding decisions on subjective criteria, any "as applied" challenge to § 954(d) (1) could be
quashed by the NEA, should they justify their funding decision based on general standards
of "excellence" rather than on a failure to meet the "decency and respect" requirement.
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doctrine by failing to apply the proper Rosenberger standards and by
misapplying the doctrine enunciated in Rust. Attempting tojustify up-
holding § 954(d) (1) by distinguishing Finley from Rosenberger, the
Court stated that in arts funding, "in contrast to many other subsidies,
the Government does not indiscriminately 'encourage a diversity of
views from private speakers."' 134 The Court's cramped application of
Rosenberger, however, is unconvincing. Although the Court recognized
that "the scarcity of NEA funding does not distinguish this case from
Rosenberger," it incorrectly concluded that the "competitive process ac-
cording to which the grants are allocated does."'3 5 The NEA's com-
petitive process is simply the manner in which it disperses scarce
funds. The definitive constitutional question is not whether the pro-
cess is "competitive," but whether the process employs "some accepta-
ble neutral principle" in allocating funds.'3 6
The Finley majority seemed to suggest, through its Rosenberger
analysis, that the type of subsidization present here falls under the
"government as speaker" category set forth in Rosenberger."' Under
the actual Rosenberger test, however, the NEA funding process is more
appropriately placed in the category of "expend[ing] funds to en-
courage a diversity of views from private speakers" rather than that of
government speaking on its own behalf.' 8 A brief glance at the NEA
enabling statute demonstrates that the National Endowment for the
Arts was never intended to be a tool of Congress for the expression of
134. Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2178 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834); see supra notes 76-77
and accompanying text (discussing the test formulated in Rosenberger that distinguishes be-
tween instances where the government is speaking on its own behalf and those where it is
.expending funds to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers").
135. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2178; id. at 2192 (Souter,J., dissenting) (arguing that Rosen-
berger "anticipated and specifically rejected this distinction when it held in no uncertain
terms that '[t] he government cannotjustify viewpoint discrimination among private speak-
ers on the economic fact of scarcity'" (alteration in original) (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S.
at 835)).
136. See id. at 2192 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Scarce money demands choices, of course,
but choices 'on some acceptable [viewpoint] neutral principle,' like artistic excellence and
artistic merit...." (alteration in original) (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835)); Rosenber-
get, 515 U.S. at 835 (recognizing that when allocating scarce resources, it is "incumbent on
the State .. . to ration or allocate the scarce resources on some acceptable neutral
principle").
137. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2190 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("A second basic strand in the
Court's treatment of today's question ... in effect assumes that whether or not the statute
mandates viewpoint discrimination, there is no constitutional issue here because govern-
ment art subsidization falls within a zone of activity free from First Amendment restraints."
(internal citations omitted)).
138. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2191 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The NEA, like the student
activities fund in Rosenberger, is a subsidy scheme created to encourage expression of a
diversity of views from private speakers.").
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government ideals, nor was it enlisted to convey a government
message; rather, the NEA was created to "help create and sustain ... a
climate encouraging freedom of thought, imagination, and in-
quiry." '39 Because the NEA's purpose is to encourage a diversity of
ideas and views, when considering whether the government is acting
as speaker, it matters not that the funds are derived from the coffers
of Congress; and as Justice Souter wrote, " [t]he Government freely
admits... that it neither speaks through the expression subsidized by
the NEA, nor buys anything for itself with NEA grants. "140
While failing to apply the proper Rosenberger standards in Finley,
the Court also misapplied its unconstitutional conditions standards
enunciated in Rust. Writing for the majority in Finley, Justice
O'Connor cited Rust v. Sullivan in determining that Congress may se-
lectively fund a program to encourage certain activities without fund-
ing any alternative programs.' 4 ' But, as pointed out by the majority in
Rosenberger, in Rust, the government "did not create a program to en-
courage private speech but instead used private speakers to transmit
specific information pertaining to its own program. 142 Even in Rust
itself, the Court stated that "[we do not] suggest that funding by the
Government, even when coupled with the freedom of the fund recipi-
ents to speak outside the scope of the Government-funded project, is
invariably sufficient to justify Government control over the content of
expression." '143 Because the language of the NEA enabling statute
makes it clear that the purpose of the grant program is to encourage a
diversity of ideas,' 44 Rust adds nothing to the Court's analysis, as its
reasoning was limited by Rosenberger to situations where the state
speaks on its own behalf or "when it enlists private entities to convey
its own message. "145
Rosenberger should have been the controlling case in Finley.'46 In
Rosenberger, the Court found that
[t]he first danger to liberty lies in granting the State the
power to examine publications to determine whether or not
139. 20 U.S.C. § 951(7) (1994); see also H.R. REP. No. 99-274, at 13 (1985) ("[NEA]
programs should be open and richly diverse, reflecting the ferment of ideas which has
always made this Nation strong and free"); H.R. REP. No. 300, at 4 (1965) (maintaining
"that the intent of this act should be the encouragement of free inquiry and expression").
140. Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2190 (SouterJ., dissenting) (internal footnotes omitted).
141. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2179.
142. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
143. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 199 (1991).
144. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
145. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833; see supra note 142 and accompanying text.
146. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2191 (Souter,J., dissenting) ("Rosenberger controls here.").
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they are based on some ultimate idea and, if so, for the State
to classify them. The second, and corollary, danger is to
speech from the chilling of individual thought and
expression.
14 7
This analysis can easily be extended to Finley because "the NEA, like
the student activities fund in Rosenberger, is a subsidy scheme created to
encourage expression of a diversity of views from private speakers."" 8
Because the NEA, under § 954(d) (1), was given the power to examine
art to determine whether it met the threshold of "decency and re-
spect," and because in NEA funding, the government is not acting as
speaker or subsidizing the transmittal of a governmental message,149
the Finley Court was incorrect in failing to apply their Rosenberger view-
point discrimination test to strike down the NEA grant program as
unconstitutional.1
5 0
The outcome of Finley is problematic and raises great concern
regarding the preservation of a cognizable unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine. First, while claiming to follow precedent, the Court
continued to garble an already inconsistent unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine. Second, the Court demonstrated its willingness to give
great deference to congressional acts that are clearly intended to dis-
criminate based on viewpoint. If what the Court stated in Finley is
true, then Rosenberger only applies to situations where funds are distrib-
uted without any sort of competitive process,15 1 and the government
must "indiscriminately encourage a diversity of views" to remove a
funding decision from the "government as speaker" category, where
viewpoint discrimination is permissible.' 52 This analysis limits the ap-
147. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835.
148. Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2191 (Souter, J., dissenting).
149. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
150. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2191-92. Justice Souter stated:
Given this congressional choice to sustain freedom of expression, Rosenberger
teaches that the First Amendment forbids decisions based on viewpoint popular-
ity. So long as Congress chooses to subsidize expressive endeavors at large, it has
no business requiring the NEA to turn down funding applications of artists and
exhibitors who devote their freedom of thought, imagination, and inquiry to defy-
ing our tastes, our beliefs, or our values. It may not use the NEA's purse to "sup-
pres[s] . . . dangerous ideas."
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540,
548 (1983)).
151. See id. at 2178 (asserting that the competitive process through which the NEA
awards its grants distinguishes it from Rosenberger because the funds distributed in Rosenber-
ger were "available to all student organizations that were 'related to the educational pur-
pose of the University'" (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 824)).
152. See id. (rejecting the respondents' reliance on Rosenberger in this case because "in
the context of arts funding . . . the Government does not indiscriminately 'encourage a
diversity of views from private speakers'" (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835)).
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plicability of Rosenberger to little more than its precise factual situation.
This effect alone makes the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
more difficult to assess because it severely limits the situations in
which the fairly consistent Rosenberger reasoning will apply. The Court
is now left in the unsavory position of trying to piece together its in-
consistent pre-Rosenberger decisions along with Finley in deciding future
unconstitutional conditions cases."' While the Court may have
achieved their policy goal of allowing § 954(d) (1) to stand, this analy-
sis destroyed any semblance of a cognizable unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine which may have existed after Rosenberger.
The outcome of Finley is also problematic because by holding that
only those acts of Congress that expressly threaten the censorship of
ideas will be deemed unconstitutional, the Court implicitly afforded
Congress the power to discriminate against an individual group or an
individual viewpoint. Certainly, the lack of "directed viewpoint dis-
crimination" should not be conclusive evidence that the allocation of
an otherwise viewpoint-based benefit is consistent with the First
Amendment. This determination amounts to the Court granting
Congress a "violate the First Amendment free" card, provided that
Congress is inventive enough to reach their desired ends implicitly,
rather than expressly.
The Court could remedy their Finley errors by beginning to apply
the various unconstitutional conditions tests with consistency and by
defining with clarity how they have reached their results. Drawing a
clear distinction between content and viewpoint discrimination may
be a logical first step in analyzing the propriety of selective govern-
mental funding determinations. Should the Court continue to use
this test, it must articulate a clear doctrine governing what constitutes
content and viewpoint discrimination, rather than molding individual
cases to fit into desired categories.154 The Court encounters the same
problems when attempting to determine when Congress is funding
private speech versus when Congress grants funds acting as speaker.
Both of these distinctions may be logical, but because the Court has
never defined what these terms mean, its unconstitutional conditions
decisions now amount to judicial policymaking, with the Court seem-
ingly reaching decisions through a results oriented approach rather
153. See discussion supra Part II.B (surveying recent cases where the Court has not been
entirely consistent in its treatment of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
154. Cf Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 898 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's
conclusion that the regulations at issue amounted to viewpoint discrimination "all but evis-
cerated the line between viewpoint and content").
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than through the application of a cognizable unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court has demonstrated great difficulty in extending the well
articulated traditional unconstitutional conditions doctrine to the
modern era of government where legislative bodies use subsidies as
informal regulatory tools, as can be seen in the Court's rulings from
Arkansas Writers' Project to Finley. Most difficult for the Court to deter-
mine in this modern era are those cases where a determination seems
to involve judgments about subject matter or aesthetics, but where the
regulation is in fact an effort to control a particular point of view. 155
Unfortunately, the Court has not developed a clear policy for uncon-
stitutional conditions, and the Court's recent cases have highlighted
the inevitable problems that arise from a doctrine which allows gov-
ernmental discretion in creating and in dispersing subsidies,156 while
also attempting to ensure that the government does not use subsidies
to engage in viewpoint discrimination through "the suppression of
dangerous ideas." 57 The Court's ruling in National Endowment for the
Arts v. Finley demonstrates that as government continues to allocate
funding as an indirect means of regulating individual activities, these
two interests will continually conflict with one another, leading to an
even greater difficulty in articulating an already garbled unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine.
HAROLD B. WALTHER
155. See Sunstein, supra note 27, at 593. According to Sunstein:
Many of the most vexing questions in constitutional law result from the rise of the
modern regulatory state, which has allowed government to affect constitutional
rights, not through criminal sanctions, but instead through spending, licensing,
and employment .... It is here that constitutional law promises to receive its
most serious tests in the next generation.
Id.
156. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) ("The Government can, without
violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it be-
lieves to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative pro-
gram."); Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983) ("Congressional
selection of particular entities or persons for entitlement. . . 'is obviously a matter of policy
and discretion"' (citations omitted)).
157. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958). See, e.g., Arkansas Writers' Project,
Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229 (1987) ("[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means
that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content." (alteration in original) (quoting Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 95 (1972))).
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